Immigrants' descendants typically assimilate toward mainstream social and economic outcomes across generations. Hispanics in the United States are a possible exception to this pattern. Although there is a growing literature on intergenerational progress, or lack thereof, in education and earnings among Hispanics, there is little research on employment differences across immigrant generations. Using data from 1996 to 2017, this study reveals considerable differences in Hispanics' employment rates across immigrant generations. Hispanic immigrant men tend to have higher employment rates than non-Hispanic whites and second-and third-plus generation Hispanics. Hispanic immigrant women have much lower employment rates, but employment rates rise considerably in the second generation. Nonetheless, U.S.-born Hispanic women are less likely than non-Hispanic white women to work. The evidence thus suggests segmented assimilation, in which the descendants of Hispanic immigrants have worse outcomes across generations. While relatively low education levels do not appear to hamper Hispanic immigrants' employment, they play a key role in explaining low levels of employment among Hispanic immigrants' descendants. Race and selective ethnic attrition may also contribute to some of the patterns uncovered here.
Introduction
Immigrants typically converge toward mainstream economic and social outcomes across generations. In general, immigrants' children, grandchildren, and subsequent generations of descendants each more closely resemble the population average in terms of education, employment, earnings, and other outcomes than do immigrants themselves. Evidence of such intergenerational assimilation or integration is widespread across origins, destinations, and time periods. However, there are exceptions. Hispanics in the contemporary United States may be one of them. Studies have noted that the children of Hispanic immigrants have far more education than their parents, but gains in educational attainment appear to stall after the second generation.
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The average education level of third-plus generation Hispanics is well below that of nonHispanic whites.
This study examines differences in labor market outcomes across Hispanic immigrant generations. Understanding how Hispanics do in the labor market is important since more than one in six workers is Hispanic, and Hispanics account for a disproportionate share of labor force growth. Differences across immigrant generations may be important as well since a rising share of Hispanics is U.S.-born. This is the result of both smaller immigration flows from Latin America since the start of the Great Recession of 2007-2009 and, until the recession, relatively high birthrates among Hispanic immigrants living in the United States. Although a number of studies examine differences across immigrant generations in Hispanics' or Mexican Americans' educational attainment (e.g., Telles and Ortiz 2008; ) and in their earnings (Trejo 1997; Livingston and Kahn 2002; Fry and Lowell 2006; Blau and Kahn 2007; Duncan and Trejo 2018) , few studies have examined differences across immigrant generations in employment, which is our focus here. There is also a large literature on intragenerational assimilation among Hispanic and other immigrants that examines whether their labor market outcomes catch up with those of U.S. natives as their duration of U.S. residence increases (e.g., Chiswick 1978; Borjas 1985) .
2 While understanding intragenerational assimilation is also important, it is not our focus here.
Specifically, this study examines the employment rates of Hispanic immigrants, the children of Hispanic immigrants (the second generation), and subsequent descendants of Hispanic immigrants (the third-plus generation). We present descriptive and multivariate analyses of employment rates for those groups absolutely, relative to each other, and relative to non-Hispanic white U.S. natives. We study the period 1996 to 2017, an era that encompasses the latter half of the Great Moderation and all of the Great Recession. The large swings in the business cycle during the second half of this period led to substantial changes in employment for all demographic groups. The first half of this period witnessed substantial growth in the number of Hispanic immigrants, and the size of the second and third-plus generations grew throughout the period as the children and later descendants of Hispanic immigrants reached working age.
Although studies of labor market outcomes often focus on earnings, employment is a key labor market outcome. Needs-based transfer programs increasingly emphasize employment, as exemplified by the growth in the Earned Income Tax Credit program, shrinkage in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program, and imposition of work requirements for food stamp and Medicaid recipients in some states. Working has therefore become even more critical to most people's ability to make ends meet. In addition, differences in time spent employed over people's lifespan lead to gaps in accumulated work experience and job-related skills. Experience and skills gaps are likely to lead to differences in earnings. Income differentials then lead to disparities in savings and financial security during retirement. For immigrants, employment also facilitates integration into American society, which improves outcomes for future generations as well. Further, understanding the determinants of employment is a necessary precursor to understanding the determinants of earnings since earnings are conditional on employment.
The results here indicate substantial differences in Hispanics' employment rates across immigrant generations. Hispanic immigrant men tend to have higher employment rates than second-and third-plus generation Hispanics do, while the opposite pattern holds among Hispanic women. Nonetheless, this pattern of intergenerational assimilation reverses between the second and the third-plus generations of Hispanic women. Overall, the results paint a discouraging picture of employment among Hispanics by the third generation and beyond that appears to be largely due to relatively low educational attainment. Selective ethnic attrition, the propensity for more successful Hispanics to stop identifying themselves as such, also may play a role in the observed employment decline between the second and third-plus generations.
Background
Traditional "straight line" assimilation theory predicts that each successive immigrant generation moves closer to the population average. Such convergence occurs because of intergenerational changes such as becoming fluent in English, moving out of ethnic enclaves, becoming more familiar with local institutions and customs, and intermarrying, among other reasons.
Hispanics are a potential exception to this pattern of intergenerational assimilation for several reasons. First, discrimination and other adverse social and economic forces can result in segmented assimilation, when immigrants' descendants do not assimilate to overall population averages but rather to a lower average that prevails among non-whites or other disadvantaged populations (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993) . Changes in underlying economic trends, such as rising income inequality, also may limit upward mobility for immigrants' descendants. (Duncan and Trejo 2011; .
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Few studies have examined intergenerational differences among Hispanics in employment. Blau and Kahn (2007) show that Mexican immigrant men were more likely to be employed than U.S.-born white non-Hispanic men, controlling for age, during 1994 to 2003, while Mexican immigrant women are substantially less likely than their white counterparts to be employed. Second-and third-plus generation Mexican American men had the same employment rate after controlling for age, and both were less likely than their white counterparts to be employed. Third-plus generation women were more likely than second-generation women to be employed, and both generations were less likely than their white counterparts to be employed.
Data and Methods
This study primarily uses data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the period 1996 to 2017. The CPS is a large-scale survey of labor market outcomes conducted monthly among about 60,000 households in the United States. In addition to asking about labor market outcomes, the CPS asks about demographic characteristics, including Hispanic ethnicity, place of birth, and parents' place of birth. This enables us to determine whether someone who identifies as Hispanic is an immigrant or has at least one foreign-born parent.
Hispanics who are born abroad and not a U.S. citizen at birth are classified here as immigrants, or the first generation. birthplace. In our main analysis, we classify Hispanics who indicate they were born in Puerto
Rico as third-plus generation Hispanics unless they have a parent who was born in a foreign country, in which case they are second-generation Hispanics.
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In addition to comparing Hispanics across immigrant generations, part of the analysis compares Hispanics to third-plus generation non-Hispanic whites (referred to here as "whites").
We also include third-plus generation non-Hispanic blacks ("blacks") as a benchmark since they and Hispanics may face similar levels of discrimination and adverse labor market trends.
Hispanics can be of any race, and the majority of them identify as white. We stratify our sample of Hispanics by race in part of the analysis below, but most of the analysis combines all Hispanics regardless of race. We limit the sample to people ages 25 to 59 in order to minimize differences across groups due to school enrollment or retirement. Because there are considerable 4 The remainder are mostly from Spain or South America. residence increases (Blau and Kahn 2007) .
The sample means suggest downward assimilation for Hispanic men across immigrant generations, at least as it pertains to employment. Second-generation Hispanic men are less likely to be working than the first generation, and third-plus generation Hispanics are less likely to be working than the second generation. Second-and third-plus Hispanic generation men are less likely than whites to be working, but more likely than blacks. For Hispanic women, the sample means suggest considerable upward assimilation in employment from the first to the second generation. The third-plus generation, however, has a lower employment rate than the second generation. The third-plus generation's employment rate is also lower than black women's rate, while all three generations of Hispanic women have lower employment rates than white women. 7 We weight observations using their person weight. The results are robust to limiting the sample to housing units in their first of eight waves of participation in the CPS. These demographic differences likely contribute to the observed differences in employment rates across groups. In addition, the relationship between demographic characteristics and employment may differ across groups. We therefore turn to Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions to examine the relative roles of differences in observable characteristics and in returns to those characteristics in terms of employment.
Methods
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition involves first estimating linear probability regressions of employment separately by group. The estimated coefficients along with the sample means are then used to decompose the gap in the employment rate between the two groups into the portion due to differences in observable characteristics and the portion due to differences in coefficients,
where A and B indicate the two demographic groups being compared. The first component of the decomposition, ( � − � ) * , is the difference in sample means evaluated at a "pooled," or average, coefficient across the two groups ( * ). The second component of the decomposition, � ( − * ) + � ( * − ), is the "unexplained" portion of the gap arising from differences in coefficients, or returns, evaluated at each group's respective sample means.
The second component is often interpreted as the portion of the gap that is due to discrimination.
We focus on the role of four sets of variables in employment rate gaps across groups:
age, education, family structure, and general economic conditions. In the linear probability regressions underlying equation (1), we measure age using indicator variables for single year of age rather than the broad age groups shown in Table 1 . 8 We measure education using indicator variables for whether someone has not completed high school, only completed high school, attended some college, or has at least a bachelor's degree. Our measures of family structure are marital status (married, divorced, widowed, separated, or never married), the number of children under age 6 at home, and the number of children age 6 and older at home. Our measures of general economic conditions are the state unemployment rate and time fixed effects (month by year). The former measures state-level economic conditions while the latter captures changes in national economic conditions. The time fixed effects also capture any other national-level changes that affect Hispanics and whites differently, such as changes in immigration policies.
The estimates give the joint contribution of the differences in means or coefficients for each set 8 When estimating the decompositions, we include the base category for each set of dummy variables and transform the coefficients into deviations from means so that the choice of the base category does not affect the results.
Appendix Tables 1 and 2 show the estimated coefficients with a base category omitted for each set of indicator variables. The estimated coefficients of the age and year fixed effects are not included to conserve space but are available on request.
of variables to the total employment rate gap between two groups; the tables also indicate whether the total employment gap and those joint contributions are statistically significant at conventional levels.
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As Table 1 shows, there are considerable differences in some of the sample means across groups. There are also considerable differences in some of the estimated coefficients from the linear probability regressions that underlie the Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions. Appendix Tables   1 and 2 report the estimated coefficients from the basic regressions for men and women, respectively. Hispanic immigrants have much smaller returns to education, or smaller penalties to low education levels and smaller rewards to high education levels, in terms of employment than the other groups examined here. The relationship between marital status and employment also tends to be different for Hispanic immigrants than for the other groups examined here.
Indeed, many of the variables we include are less strongly related to employment for Hispanics immigrants than for other groups, as evidenced by the smaller coefficients for Hispanic immigrants in Appendix Tables 1 and 2 . The estimated coefficients for second-generation Hispanics tend to be in between those for immigrants and the third-plus generation. This suggests intergenerational assimilation in the determinants of employment.
Results
Tables 2 and 3 present the main decomposition results for men and women, respectively. These decompositions all have whites as the benchmark. The first column in Table 2 , for example, presents results for the employment gap between Hispanic immigrant men and white men. The raw employment gap is 0.018, or Hispanic immigrant men are 1.8 percentage points more likely 9 Standard errors for the contributions to the decompositions are available on request.
than white men to be working. As the middle panel shows, that gap would be much larger absent the difference in education levels between the two groups: Hispanic immigrant men are 7.3 percentage points less likely than white men to be employed as a result of their lower education levels when evaluating the difference in education levels at the average relationship between education and employment for the two groups. Differences in economic conditions also narrow the employment gap between the two groups. Differences in age and family structure, in contrast, contribute to the employment rate gap between Hispanic immigrants and whites. The younger age distribution and higher marriage rate among Hispanic men boost their employment rate relative to white men.
Differences in the estimated relationship between education and employment also contribute to the employment gap between male Hispanic immigrants and whites, as the bottom panel in column 1 of Table 2 shows. Again, the gradient between education and employment is considerably flatter among Hispanic immigrants than among whites-the employment penalty to not having completed high school is much smaller among Hispanic immigrants than among whites, and the employment gain to having attended or completed college is much smaller as well. Differences in the relationships between family structure variables and employment reduce the gap, in contrast. The difference in the constant, which captures unobserved factors, plays the biggest role in explaining why Hispanic immigrant men are more likely than white men to be employed. This is consistent with positive selection on unobservable characteristics among Hispanic immigrant men, as well as with undocumented status. Being undocumented, as well as arriving in the U.S. recently, means low eligibility for safety net programs, boosting labor force participation among Hispanic immigrant men, and possibly return migration by unemployed Hispanic immigrant men.
As with Hispanic immigrants, education levels play an important role in the employment gap between second-and third-plus generation Hispanic and white men. Unlike Hispanic immigrant men, those groups are less likely than whites to be working. Lower levels of education can more than account for the employment gap between second-generation Hispanics and whites, while they can account for half of the employment gap for the third-plus generation.
Their relative youth reduces the employment gaps between those two groups and whites, while differences in family structure-namely being more likely to be never married and less likely to have young children at home-contributes to the gaps. Differences in the estimated coefficients on the education variables make a small contribution to the gaps as well. Interestingly, while
Hispanic immigrants have a smaller return to education in terms of employment than whites do, the opposite tend to hold for U.S.-born Hispanics-the employment gains to attending college are typically higher for U.S.-born Hispanics than for whites (Appendix Tables 1 and 2 ).
Blacks serve as a comparison group of disadvantaged Americans. The magnitude of the employment gap between black and white men-14.2 percentage points-is considerably larger than between U.S.-born Hispanic and white men. Nonetheless, the pattern of the decomposition results tend to be similar for second-and third-plus generation Hispanic men and black men.
There are two notable exceptions: the contributions of the estimated coefficients on education and economic conditions. The education coefficients play no role in explaining black-white employment differences, but that is because black men have a larger employment penalty to not completing high school and a larger employment premium to attending or completing college than white men, and those differences net to a zero contribution. With regard to economic conditions, black men's employment is considerably more cyclical than employment among whites or Hispanics, and this difference makes a major contribution to the employment gap between white and black men.
As with men, differences in education levels are an important contributor to employment gaps between Hispanic women and white women. As the first column of Table 3 reports, Hispanic immigrant women are more than 18 percentage points less likely than white women to be working, and differences in education levels can account for almost two-thirds of the gap.
Differences in family structure and how family structure is related to employment are also important contributors to the employment gap between Hispanic immigrant women and whites:
Hispanic immigrants have more young children at home, on average, and married Hispanic immigrant women are considerably less likely than never-married ones to be working, whereas employment rates do not differ significantly between married and never-married white women.
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Differences in economic conditions make a small contribution to the observed employment gap, whereas differences in age act to reduce the gap for all generations of Hispanic women relative to whites. As with Hispanic immigrant men, the flatter gradient between education and employment boosts the employment rate among Hispanic immigrant women relative to white women.
Second-generation Hispanic women are also less likely than white women to be working, but the gap narrows considerably to about 3 percentage points. Lower levels of education can fully account for the employment gap between female second-generation Hispanics and whites. Differences in family structure, economic conditions, and the relationship between education and employment also contribute to the employment gap between secondgeneration Hispanic women and whites. Differences in the relationship between economic conditions and employment act to raise employment among second-generation Hispanic women relative to whites, but this is largely offset by differences in the constant. Lower levels of education can explain almost three-fourths of the employment gap between third-plus generation Hispanic women and whites. Differences in family structure, namely having more young children, also contribute to the employment gap between third-plus generation Hispanic women and whites.
Black women fall in between second-and third-plus generation Hispanic women in terms of their employment gap relative to whites. As with Hispanic women, differences in education are a key factor in the employment gap between black and white women. Unlike white women, married black women are more likely than never-married ones to be working, a pattern that also holds among third-plus generation Hispanic women and that acts to reduce the employment gap for both groups.
Differences by Hispanics' Race
The above results combine all Hispanics regardless of race and compare them with non-Hispanic whites. But employment patterns may differ systematically by race, and intergenerational differences in the distribution of Hispanics by race may contribute to the patterns observed above. If assimilation is segmented for reasons related to race, employment rates of white Hispanics may become more similar to those of white non-Hispanics across generations, while employment rates of non-white Hispanics may become more similar to those of black nonHispanics. To examine this possibility, we separate Hispanics into those who are indicated as white only in the CPS, those who are mixed race or other race (anything other than white only or black only), and those who are black only. 11 The top three rows of Table 4 show the employment gaps for those three racial groups relative to non-Hispanic whites by generation, while the bottom two rows show the employment gaps for mixed/other race and black Hispanics relative to black non-Hispanics.
The results indicate racial differences in the employment gaps, but the pattern of downward or segmented intergenerational assimilation is present for Hispanic men of all races and regardless of the reference group. Foreign-born Hispanic men who are white are more likely than white non-Hispanics to be working, whereas those who are black are less likely. For all three racial groups, second-generation Hispanic men are less likely than white non-Hispanics to be working, and the employment gap relative to non-Hispanic whites increases as we move from whites to mixed race to black Hispanics. The gaps widen for the third-plus generation, and this widening is more pronounced for mixed/other race and black Hispanics than for white Hispanics.
Comparing mixed/other race and black Hispanic men with black non-Hispanic men (the bottom two rows of Table 4 ), Hispanics tend to initially have much higher employment rates than the latter, but the gap again narrows across generations.
In all three racial groups, foreign-born Hispanic women have lower employment rates than white or black non-Hispanic women. The gap goes away or turns positive, however, in the second generation. The jump in employment between first-and second-generation Hispanic women is followed by a drop between the second and third-plus generations. Comparing the coefficients within a given column reveals that within each generation, white Hispanic men are more likely than mixed/other race or black Hispanic men to be working. The same is true among third-plus generation Hispanic women, but white foreign-born and second-generation Hispanic women are less likely to be employed than those who are mixed/other race or black.
Differences by Country of Origin
Differences by country of origin of immigrants themselves or their ancestors are also of potential interest. There may be differences by origin for several reasons, including differences in immigrant selectivity and motives for migration, in legal status, in the quality of education that immigrants received before migrating, and in cultural attitudes toward women working outside the home. Table 5 reports employment gaps relative to whites for the largest origin groups of Hispanics: Mexicans, Cubans, Dominicans, and Puerto Ricans.
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There is considerable diversity in employment gaps across Hispanics by origin. As the first column shows, among first-generation immigrants, only Mexican men are more likely than whites to be employed. Cuban-and Puerto-Rican born men are less likely than white men to be employed. Those two groups have relatively high eligibility rates for safety net programs since Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens and almost all Cubans qualify for refugee status and legal permanent residence, after which they eventually are eligible to become naturalized U.S.
citizens. Mexican immigrants, in contrast, are much more likely to be unauthorized and hence ineligible for government assistance programs. As the fourth column shows, all groups of firstgeneration (immigrant) Hispanic women are less likely than whites to be employed, but there are 12 Until now, Puerto Ricans have been included in the third-plus generation since they are US citizens. In Table 5 , "immigrants" from Puerto Rico is all Hispanics living in the U.S. who were born in Puerto Rico; the second generation is Hispanics who have at least one parent born in Puerto Rico; and the third-plus generation is Hispanics born in the U.S. whose ethnicity is reported as Puerto Rican with parents also born in the U.S. Public school education in Puerto Rico is conducted in Spanish, potentially making Puerto Ricans quite different from other U.S.-born Hispanics. The results for the third-plus generation in Tables 2 and 3 are robust to dropping Puerto Ricans from the sample, although the employment gaps relative to whites are about 2 percentage points smaller. The third-plus generation still has a significantly lower employment rate than the second generation when Puerto Ricans are dropped.
considerable differences in the magnitude of the employment gap. As the fifth column shows, second-generation Cuban American women are actually more likely than white women to be employed. The pattern of downward assimilation suggested by larger employment gaps between third-plus generation Hispanics and whites than between second-generation Hispanics and whites occurs among Mexican American men and among Cuban American and Dominican American men and women.
In decomposition results not show here, differences in education levels and in family structure contribute to lower employment rates among most country of origin groups of Hispanics relative to whites. 13 The one notable exception is second-generation Cuban Americans, whose education levels boost their employment rates relative to whites' rates.
Differences in the age structure boost employment rates among most origin groups of Hispanics relative to whites. There is no clear pattern in the contributions of differences in the estimated coefficients.
Differences by Naturalized U.S. Citizenship
We now turn from comparisons between Hispanics and whites to comparisons between groups of Hispanics. We first compare Hispanic immigrants who are naturalized U.S. citizens with those who are not. Many Hispanic immigrants who are not naturalized citizens are unauthorized immigrants, but certainly not all. Naturalization rates are particularly low among eligible Mexican immigrants (Gonzalez-Barrera 2017). Naturalized immigrants may be more assimilated since they have usually been in the United States longer than other immigrants and because immigrants must take the citizenship test in English unless they are elderly. Given that 13 All results discussed but not shown are available on request.
Hispanic immigrant men are more likely than whites to be employed, assimilation may mean a lower likelihood of employment. In addition, the near-universal labor force participation among unauthorized immigrant men may cause the employment rate to be higher among nonnaturalized men than among naturalized men. The opposite is likely to be the case among women. Unauthorized immigrant women tend to have lower labor force participation and employment rates than legal immigrant women (Orrenius and Zavodny 2015) .
The results only partly bear out these predictions. As column 1 of Table 6 indicates, there is no significant difference in employment between naturalized and non-naturalized Hispanic immigrant men. However, Hispanic immigrant women who are naturalized citizens are much more likely than non-naturalized citizens to be employed (column 2). The gap is driven by higher education levels, fewer children at home, and differences in how family structure is related to employment.
Differences by Age at Arrival
Immigrants who arrived as children are typically more assimilated than those who arrived as adults. Childhood arrivals are more likely to attend at least some school in the United States, which typically increases their English fluency and their familiarity with U.S. culture and institutions. Because their outcomes often fall in between those of immigrants who arrived as adults and the second generation, childhood arrivals are sometimes called the 1.5 generation.
Given the patterns among Hispanic immigrants as a whole relative to whites, male childhood arrivals may be less likely to be working than male adult arrivals, while the opposite may be true among females.
Columns 3 and 4 of and employment also act to boost employment among child arrivals relative to adult arrivals, particularly for women. However, differences in the relationship between education and employment act to reduce the employment rate among childhood arrivals relative to adult arrivals. Other, unobservable factors drive the lower employment rate among male childhood arrivals relative to adult arrivals. This may reflect the fact that most male adult arrivals are labor migrants, whereas childhood arrivals likely migrated for a wider variety of reasons.
Differences by Number of Foreign-born Parents
Having one versus two foreign-born parents may affect the extent of assimilation among second-generation immigrants. Second-generation Hispanics who have only one foreign-born parent may be more assimilated than those with two foreign-born parents. Given the patterns among Hispanic immigrants as a whole, this would predict that second-generation Hispanic men with one foreign-born parent have a lower employment rate than those with two foreign-born parents, while the opposite should hold among women.
The results bear out this prediction for men but not for women. Columns 5 and 6 of Table   6 show the decomposition of the employment gap between second-generation Hispanics with one versus two foreign-born parents. As predicted, Hispanic men with only one foreign-born parent are less likely than those with two foreign-born parents to be working. This result is consistent with the downward assimilation suggested by the overall results for men in Table 2 .
The gap is mainly due to differences in unobservable factors captured by the constant. Hispanic women with only one foreign-born parent are also less likely to be working that those with two foreign-born parents. This result is surprising since we would expect upward assimilation in employment among women. Differences in the age and education distributions contribute to the employment gap for women.
Employment Gaps across Hispanic Immigrant Generation Cohorts
Generational comparisons in cross-sectional data like those presented above may be misleading because they do not necessarily match parents and grandparents with their descendants (Smith 2003 (Smith , 2006 . Our use of a fairly long time period, 1996-2017, and a wide age range, 25-59, exacerbates this concern. Although we cannot match parents with their adult children in the CPS unless they live in the same household, we can construct synthetic generations comprised of likely parents and their children by narrowing the time period and age range we use. 14 Specifically, we examine two shorter time periods, 1996-1997 and 2016-2017 , and a smaller ten-year age group, age 25-34. Doing so enables us to compare a parents' generation-immigrant or second-generation Hispanics who are ages 25-34 in 1996-1997-with their children's generation-second-or third-plus generation Hispanics who are ages 25-34 in 2016-2017. Table 7 reports the employment rates for these groups and time periods.
The patterns of the employment rates across immigrant generation cohorts over time are similar to the earlier cross-sectional results. For Hispanic men, employment declines across 14 Studies using this immigration generation cohort approach (also sometimes termed "lagged birth cohorts") include Farley and Alba (2002) , Smith (2003) , and Park and Myers (2010 Employment is higher among the second generation than among the third-plus generation, however, at 72 percent versus 69 percent. This pattern is consistent with downward intergenerational assimilation among men, and upward then downward intergenerational assimilation among women. Table 8 presents results for Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions of the employment gaps across immigrant generation cohorts over time. 15 The results again point to differences in mean education levels and in the relationship between education and employment as major Hispanics are more likely than older ones to have two foreign-born parents (Perlmann 2005) .
Whether the intergenerational gap persists or ameliorates as young second-generation Hispanics move through the lifecycle is a key question.
Disentangling the Third-Plus Generation and Ethnic Attrition
The above results for the third-plus generation combine Hispanics with at least one foreign-born grandparent with Hispanics whose families have been in the United States for a century or more. The CPS does not allow us to distinguish between the third and higher generations. To distinguish between the third and fourth-plus generations we turn to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). Like the CPS, the NLSY97 asked participants'
Hispanic ethnicity and the birthplace of their parents, but it also has questions about the birthplace of grandparents. 17 The NLSY97 is a panel study of about 9000 participants who were ages 12 to 17 when first interviewed in 1997. The study included an oversample of Hispanics (and blacks). All immigrants in the NLSY97 are childhood arrivals since the sample is not replenished over time, and a smaller share of them may be unauthorized than among the CPS sample. Hispanic immigrants in the NLSY97 therefore may be more assimilated than a representative sample of all Hispanic immigrants. We use data from round 15, which occurred in 2011 for most participants. Respondents were ages 26 to 31 at that time. 18 We use a cross section from the NLSY instead of exploiting its panel nature since we focus on differences across immigrant generations at a given point in time instead of changes over time as a given cohort in each immigrant generation ages. With just one cohort to observe, we would be combining aging, assimilation, and time effects. Hispanic women are less likely than whites to be employed.
The NLSY97 data reveal a substantial difference between the third and the fourth-plus Hispanic immigrant generations. For both men and women, the third generation is more likely than the second generation to be working. Meanwhile, the fourth-plus generation is substantially less likely than the third and second generations to be working. This suggests that the fourth-plus generation drives the drop in employment between the second and third-plus generations observed in the CPS data. However, we caution that the NLSY97 Hispanic generations are small sample sizes and may not be representative of the broader Hispanic population: they are a particular age and birth cohort, and they were willing to participate in a very detailed survey (and remained in it for a long time, since we examine the 15 th wave of the survey).
Tables 10 and 11 present Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results for Hispanic and black men and women in the NLSY97, respectively, relative to whites. As in the CPS data, the results indicate that lower average education levels reduce employment among Hispanics of every immigrant generation relative to whites. The same is true for blacks relative to whites. The relationship between education and employment widens the gap between second-and thirdgeneration Hispanic women and whites, while it narrows the gap for third-generation Hispanic men.
The finding that fourth-plus generation Hispanics appear to be more disadvantaged than other Hispanics is consistent with previous research showing a similar pattern for educational attainment (Alba et al. 2011; Bean et al. 2015; ). As immigrants-are identified as Hispanic. 21 We are unable to estimate the extent of ethnic attrition in the fourth-plus generation in the NLSY97 and in the third-plus generation in the CPS.
Unfortunately, those are the generations where selective ethnic attrition may be the most prevalent. It therefore is an open question whether the apparent downward intergenerational assimilation in employment among Hispanics is due to selective ethnic attrition, particularly among the third-plus or fourth-plus generation.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Researchers and policymakers often view U.S. Hispanics as a single, uniform group. Doing so not only combines Hispanics from different origin areas but also combines immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants. This study indicates that there are several notable differences in employment across Hispanic immigrant generations: First-generation Hispanic men are more likely than second-and third-plus generation men to be employed. There is a large jump in employment from first-to second-generation Hispanic women, whereas third-plus generation women are less likely than second-generation women to be employed. Taken together, the results point to segmented assimilation among Hispanics, particularly for Hispanic men. Although there are differences in employment rates by Hispanics' race, a pattern of downward movement across generations prevails for white and non-white Hispanics alike, with the exception of first-to second-generation women. Selective ethnic attrition beyond the third generation may contribute to the patterns observed here. But even if selective ethnic attrition does underlie the results, the fact that U.S. natives who identify as Hispanic have lower employment rates than people who identify as non-Hispanic whites is a cause for concern and warrants further study.
This study offers a detailed examination of intergenerational differences in Hispanics'
employment. It raises a number of areas for further research, including in-depth analysis of the causes of the patterns revealed here. Understanding why U.S.-born Hispanics' education levels lag behind those of non-Hispanic whites is particularly important. Although the share of Hispanic young adults who have not completed high school has fallen considerably over time, it still remains twice that among non-Hispanic whites and above that of non-Hispanic blacks as well (Gramlich 2017) . Examining intragenerational changes as cohorts age and as the U.S.
economy evolves-a topic we do not examine here-is also worthy of attention. The discouraging picture painted by the data used here may moderate or even disappear as today's large young cohorts of second-and third-generation Hispanics age.
The high employment rate among male Hispanic immigrants suggests that immigration policy, perhaps in conjunction with other policies that limit access to the safety net, attracts
Hispanic immigrant men who work. But low employment rates among second and especially third-plus generation Hispanic men and women relative to non-Hispanic whites point to the importance of finding policies that can help remediate the disadvantages Hispanic immigrants' descendants may face. Increasing educational attainment, particularly high school graduation rates, and school quality is a key area. Doing so will become increasingly important in the United
States since the size and share of the native-born Hispanic population are projected to continue to grow in the coming decades. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 Note: Shown are estimated coefficients from linear probability regressions with employment as the dependent variable. Regressions also include dummy variables for single year of age and for time (month*year). Observations are weighted using the final person weights, and standard errors are clustered on state.
